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Issues and Concerns in Developing Regulated Markets for 
Endangered Species Products: The Case of Rhinoceros 
Horns 
Abstract: 
A proposal for addressing rhinoceros poaching is to legalise the trade in rhino horn and 
adopt a regulated market approach (RMA), overturning the current trade ban. This 
orthodox economic prescription aims to reduce incentives to poach endangered wildlife 
by driving down the market price of their products via auctioned stockpile releases. 
Biologists are clear, however, that securing a stockpile for some species needs 
biological success in captive breeding programmes (CBPs) which varies markedly 
across species and habitats. Rhinoceros herds in a CBP would need spatially extensive 
terrain and costly permanent security measures, and this only appears feasible for the 
less aggressive “white” rhino.  We argue that market price would actually need to be 
sustained at a high level to cover protection costs over the longer reproduction cycles in 
CBPs and that, without extensive monitoring and the correct institutional structures 
being in place, legalising trade may encourage, rather than prevent, poaching. 
Supplementary policy measures that differentiate among consumer groups would also 
likely prove necessary. 
Keywords:  Rhinoceros, endangered species, black markets, poaching, captive breeding 
programs 
JEL classification: Q11, Q57, Q58 
1. Introduction 
Given that the number of rhinoceros are killed annually by poachers in South Africa to 
acquire their horns has more than tripled between 2010 (333 poaching incidents) and 
2014 (1215 poaching incidents), there is an increasingly urgent policy imperative to 
help save them from extinction. The demand for rhino horn stems largely from its use in 
Traditional Eastern Medicine (TEM) in Thailand, China, Vietnam and Laos, but also as 
a speculative asset (Rademeyer, 2012). The very high price of rhino horn, which sold 
for approximately $65,000 per kilogram in 2011 (‘t Sas-Rolfes, 2012), also means that, 
despite costly increases in security to prevent poaching, the incentive to poach, even in 
high risk situations, is likely to remain high. An additional factor is the vast price 
difference between the price of live rhino (approximately $30,000 in 2012 in South 
Africa) and the price of rhino horn, which has led to various illegal “game farm” 
purchases of rhino (which are then killed for their horns) and pseudo-hunting activities, 
often with forged permits (Rademeyer, 2012). 
Ostrom and Cox (2010) point out that there has been a tendency for social scientists to 
reduce environmental and natural resource governance problems to an overly simple 
choice between the market and the government, what they refer to as the panacea 
problem. As early as 1990, North pointed out that any particular institution exists in a 
network or matrix of other institutions that affects its functioning and outcomes. More 
recent debates (Boyer 2005; Crouch et al. 2005) have further explored the notion of 
institutional complementarity and hierarchy. According to Boyer (2005), two 
institutions are said to be complementary when the performance of one in conjunction 
with the other is better than when it exists alone (and vice versa). Institutions may be 
complementary because “..components of a whole mutually compensate for each 
other’s deficiencies in constituting the whole” (Crouch et al. 2005:359). However, it 
may also be related to institutional hierarchy, where a particular institutional form 
dominates others, so that those institutions further down the hierarchy must take into 
account the rules and regulations imposed by the dominant one (Helderman 2007). In 
this case, Boyer (2005) argues that causality is implied, in that the institutions further 
down the hierarchy could not exist if those higher up were not present.  
Helderman (2007) argues that, rather than purely market based forms (where multiple 
producers are motivated by profits, and consumers gain benefits through competition) 
or purely government forms (command and control, motivated by welfare gains), most 
developed economies have a wide variety of mixed institutional forms. Regulated 
markets are an example of such a hybrid. The key question then becomes not so much 
which form of institutional governance will be chosen, but rather what their relationship 
will be and which one will be dominant. While Boyer (2005) argues that institutions can 
be designed to be complementary right from the start, Helderman (2007) suggests that 
complementarity is more likely to be discovered ex post, after a period of trial and error 
and learning by doing. In this case, institutions that are later understood to be 
complementary may initially be seen as competing with each other.  
We argue that such a panacea problem currently plagues the debate on legalising the 
trade in rhino horn. The current failure of the government to effectively protect rhino 
has led to the call for trade in rhino horn to be legalised. This market approach is 
presented as an unproblematic and simple solution to rhino poaching, without any 
serious consideration of the context in which such an institution would operate. While 
not ruling out the potential role that a RMA could play in both funding conservation and 
managing rhino poaching in the long run, the paper argues that, without extensive 
monitoring and the correct institutional structures being in place, legalising trade may 
encourage, rather than prevent, poaching. Fischer (2010) stresses that the absence of 
strong institutional structures will lead to the overexploitation of the resource without 
considering the impact on future harvesting possibilities. 
Various economists have reconciled themselves, often reluctantly, to the need for some 
kind of regulated market approach (RMA) to be adopted, within a policy mix of 
instruments, in the service of wildlife conservation and the saving of many endangered 
species from extinction (Damania and Bulte, 2007; Fischer, 2004).  The intention of this 
paper is explicitly to set out some practical concerns and issues that seem to have been 
underplayed or neglected in most published economic discourse on the subject. The 
underpinning work is based on a number of commissioned practical economic 
assessments among the author team, a review of the scientific literature on captive 
breeding programs (CBPs) for rhinoceros herds and two interviews with key informants 
in South Africa. The analysis is purely intended to help inform practical decisions on 
the feasibility of this economic prescription and to do so specifically in the context of 
rhinoceros herd conservation.  
Various policy concerns relating to the introduction of a RMA are raised and illustrated, 
which may potentially be addressed with a range of additional or supplementary policy 
instruments geared to influencing market outcomes in one or both of the therapeutic use 
market segment and the speculative asset market segment for rhinoceros horn.   
The paper is organised in the following manner: the next section reviews the scientific 
and institutional evidence and literature that can inform the economic analysis of 
rhinoceros conservation supplemented by the analysis of some interview data with game 
reserve and expert scientific informants.  Particular attention is given to the practical 
requirements for accumulating a stockpile of rhinoceros horns for auction via CBPs and 
licensed reserve management and/or trophy hunting.  Consideration is given to the 
likely effects, in this specific wildlife context, of the introduction of additional suppliers 
that are state sanctioned and regulated and the possible need for further supplementary 
policy instruments and supportive measures.  Policy implications arising are then 
discussed followed by a summary and some concluding remarks. 
2. Rhinoceros conservation in the South African context 
There are currently five species of rhinoceros worldwide, two of which are found in 
Africa: The southern White rhino (Ceratotherium simum simum) and the Black rhino 
(Diceros bicornis) (Emslie et al., 2007). All species are listed in the Convention of 
International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) which was open for signature in 
1973, came into force in 1975 and has been ratified and amended many times 
subsequently. Since 1977, there has been a complete international trade ban on rhino 
horn, although a limited number of hunting permits for White rhino are granted, which 
includes the right of the hunter to remove trophies (‘t Sas-Rolfes, 2012; TRAFFIC, 
2012). Nearly 95% of White rhino and 40% of Black rhino are found in South Africa 
(Borchert, 2012; TRAFFIC 2012).  
The conservation of the White rhino is regarded as something of a success story. 
Although hunted almost to extinction in the 19th century, White rhino populations had 
recovered to 840 by 1960, but were found almost exclusively in what is now the 
Hluhluwe-Umfolozi Park in KwaZulu-Natal Province in South Africa. Through the 
development of game capture techniques, Operation Rhino was initiated in the 1960’s to 
capture surplus White rhino in the Hluhluwe-Umfolozi Park, and transport them to other 
protected areas in South Africa (‘t Sas-Rolfes, 2010). Since then the number of White 
rhino has increased dramatically, from 6,736 in 1993 to an estimated 16,723 in 2007 
(Animal Rights Africa, 2009), to 18,800 in 2012 (TRAFFIC, 2012). Although it is  
deemed conservation dependent, the White rhino is no longer regarded as threatened or 
endangered (TRAFFIC, 2012:9). The population of Black rhino is much smaller, at an 
estimated 4,880 worldwide, of which 1915 are found in South Africa. Black rhino are 
still listed as critically endangered (Evans, 2012; TRAFFIC, 2012).  
International trade in rhino horn was banned under CITES in 1977, although trade 
within South Africa was legal until 2009, when a moratorium on internal trade was put 
in place by the government as a response to reports of illegal exporting of horn sourced 
from private rhino owners and government stockpiles (Government Gazette, 2009). 
However, a study was commissioned by the Department of Environmental Affairs to 
determine the feasibility of relaxing the ban on legal trade in rhino horn within South 
Africa (DEA, 2014). The report concluded that, without the implementation of 
extensive monitoring (such as DNA tracking and regular auditing of private and public 
stockpiles), lifting the national moratorium would only encourage illegal practices, such 
as laundering of illegal horn through legal markets. It was thus recommended that 
“South Africa should not lift the national moratorium at the present time” (DEA, 
2014:12). However, the report did make the point that the complete ban was not a long 
term solution, and that national systems required to make a regulated market function 
should begin to be put in place (DEA, 2014).  
The next CITES meeting, where pro-trade lobbyists hope that the CITES body will lift 
the ban international trade in white rhino horn, is to be held in Johannesburg in 2016. 
However, if the national moratorium is still in place, it would weaken the case for lifting 
the CITES international trade ban (Times Live, 2015). In 2012, a private rhino owner 
who had already invested in captive breeding programmes, initiated legal action against 
the DEA in an attempt to force the government to lift the national ban on rhino horn 
trade, joined in 2015 by another private owner (Cruise, 2015a). The DEA appointed a 
committee of enquiry in 2012. Originally kept secret, membership of the committee was 
later revealed and criticised by the media (see for example Cruise, 2015b) for being 
made up of mostly pro-trade lobbyists. However, to date, the committee has not yet 
made a recommendation.  
In contrast to the exceptionally high prices paid for rhino horn on the black markets of 
Asia, where it is “..worth more per kilogram than gold, cocaine, platinum or heroin” 
(Rademeyer, 2012:ix), the average price of live rhino has fallen. Table 1 presents some 
illustrative points showing the dramatic fall in prices for live rhino, especially after the 
upsurge of poaching in 2005 and 2008, which led to the national moratorium of the sale 
of rhino horn inside the country in 2009. The DEA feasibility study (2014) identifies 
similar trends. Further, some of these comparator commodities are actually appropriate 
given the nature of the illegal criminal networks involved in the rhinoceros supply 
chain, some of whom are also suspected of trading in narcotics and issuing death threats 
as a routine operational tactic (Mouton, 2012). 
Insert Table 1 
The above data may give a somewhat mixed picture, since average auction price does 
not take into account differences in price for male and female animals, the condition, 
size and age of the animals, and the sale of more than one animal (usually a mother and 
calf) as a single unit. For example, the auction price of a mother and calf in 2012 was 
R400, 000 (GFR Game Sale, 2012). At this same auction, of the six single adult white 
rhinos offered for auction, only two were sold (two females), while three males and a 
female were not sold. What is apparent is that rhino prices dropped dramatically in 
2005, since which time they have recovered slowly, but never to the peak 2004 average 
price of nearly R390, 000.   
Using data for average auction prices received for rhino sold in KwaZulu-Natal from 
2000 to 2005, Spenceley and Barnes (2005) found that the price for White rhino had 
dropped 50% from an average of US$34,888 in 2000, to $17,393 in 2005, while the 
average price of Black rhino had dropped 21%. At the same time, the number of 
animals sold also declined. According to Fike, the manager of a large public reserve in 
South Africa (Pers. Comm., 2012), the drop in price and sales volumes can be explained 
by a declining demand for live rhino. The decrease in demand is due to the costly 
increases in security required in order to keep them alive, as well as the risks of losing 
them to poachers despite spending on security. An example of the increase in security 
costs to a reserve in South Africa that is known to have rhino is given in Appendix 
Table A. What it illustrates is that the costs of keeping and protecting rhino in the wild 
have increased dramatically, without any offsetting increase in revenue. It is thus not 
surprising that the market prices for live rhino have declined. 
What is also becoming apparent is that, despite numerous awareness and fundraising 
campaigns, the current policy focus of increased security in both public and private 
parks known to have rhinos is not an effective deterrent. As shown in Table 2, poaching 
related arrests have by no means increased at the same rate as poaching incidents (DEA, 
2012). South Africa has high rates of unemployment (25.2% according to the Quarter 1 
2015 Labour Force Survey) and poverty. In 2011, 45.5% (23 million people) were 
living below the poverty line, and 20% (10 million people) were living in “extreme” 
poverty (Statistics South Africa, 2014). Given these figures, the supply of poachers, 
often ex-military, according to Fike (Pers. Comm., 2012), who are willing to take the 
risk for huge rewards, is virtually limitless. The Kruger National Park, who have lost 
more rhino to poaching than anywhere else, make this link explicit: “With a large 
amount of poverty in South Africa and unemployment rates escalating, finding people 
that are willing to sacrifice being caught while going out to poach a rhino is not 
difficult, as the benefits potentially outweigh the consequences” (Nicholson, 2014). 
A recent book by the South African investigative journalist, Julian Rademeyer (2012), 
makes this clear in an interview with a Zimbabwean rhino conservation manager: 
“’Killing poachers doesn’t achiever anything’, Leatham says. ‘There are so 
many poor guys out there and criminal elements that are prepared to take the 
risk to make quick bucks. No matter how many of them you shoot or arrest, 
you’ll never stop it. The only way is to cull the market. You have got to get 
the guys at the top’” (Rademeyer, 2012: 22). 
Insert Table 2 
Despite the acknowledgement that poaching syndicates are highly sophisticated, and 
driven by mafia-style bosses at the top of long supply chains (Rademeyer, 2012), most 
arrests are of on-the-ground poachers, not syndicate leaders. For example, of the 246 
arrests make in 2012, 217 were poachers, 18 were couriers, and only 11 were receivers 
(DEA 2012). Guidelines for rhino conservation strategies in the region (SADC-RPRC, 
2006) make a similar point, arguing that increasing encounters between poachers and 
rangers is also not necessarily a sign of the success of conservation efforts, even where 
all or most of these encounters are won by rangers. “Once diverse groups of poachers 
have started frequent incursions, the situation deteriorates into a ‘poaching war’ and the 
rate at which rhinos are lost can soon become unsustainable” (SADC-RPRC, 2006:58). 
There have also been calls for the South African Government to sell existing stockpiles, 
accumulated from de-horning, natural mortality, and the seizure of illegal horns, in 
order to generate funds for conservation efforts, and a proposal for a once-off sale of 
such stockpiles may be put to the CITES body in 2016 (News24, 2015). Currently held 
stockpiles in South Africa are estimated to be worth more than R1 billion (Pillay, 2012). 
Lopes (2015) uses a bioeconomic model to demonstrate the likely outcomes of the rise 
of high-technology sophisticated poaching operations on African elephants if (i) 
stockpile release and regulated trade reduced the price of ivory and (ii) an increase in 
anti-poaching security. His findings show that “..the optimal number of planned 
poaching expeditions was found to be insensitive to the black-market price of ivory, but 
quite sensitive to the probability of interception by anti-poaching patrols” (Lopes, 
2015:102). He points out that his model could be extended to other natural resources 
that are harvested illegally, such as rhinos, and concludes that focusing effort on anti-
poaching methods would be more likely work as a conservation strategy than trying to 
influence the black market price of these goods.  
t’Sas-Rolfes and Fitzgerald (2013) argue that a regulated market for rhino horn could 
play an important part in helping to conserve rhinos through both reducing the price of 
the horn and increasing the numbers of rhino (since they would be farmed 
commercially). They do, however, acknowledge that, for such a market system to work, 
institutional systems, such as the development of a DNA database for the horn and 
regulation and frequent inspection of stockpiles, would be needed. They also agree that 
“The science of rhino husbandry is still nascent” (t’Sas-Rolfes and Fitzgerald, 2013:13) 
and that not much is known about likely start-up costs and production rates in 
commercial breeding programmes.  
Another controversial intervention, which has been hotly debated, is the dehorning of 
rhino. At the National Rhino Summit in 2010, the South African Department of 
Environmental Affairs commissioned a dehorning impact assessment (Lindsey and 
Taylor, 2011). The report found that dehorning has been practiced in South Africa to a 
limited extent in private game reserves. Dehorning is also done routinely when rhino are 
translocated in order to reduce the risk of injury to the rhino in transit, or due to fighting 
amongst newly released individuals to establish dominance in the new setting (SADC-
RPRC, 2006). In other African countries, such as Zimbabwe, Namibia and 
Mozambique, dehorning, along with other measures (such as increased security, and 
moving vulnerable populations to smaller, more defensible areas away from borders) 
has been effective (Lindsey and Taylor, 2011; SADC-RPRC, 2006).   
However, an important finding (Lindsey and Taylor, 2011) is that, if dehorning is not 
accompanied by increases in security and other anti-poaching measures, it is not 
effective. Lindsey and Taylor report on at least five incidents in South Africa between 
2008 and 2011 where dehorned rhino were killed by poachers, since the high price of 
horn makes even the horn stumps a worthwhile target.  
Rhino horn grows at a rate of about six centimetres per year and dehorning would thus 
need to take place every 12 to 24 months to be effective under conditions of severe 
threat (Fike, Pers. Comm., 2012; Lindsey and Taylor, 2011).  In order to dehorn rhino 
legally and to store the horn, a permit is required from the South African Department of 
Environmental Affairs (DEA). The permitting process is regarded by some reserve 
managers to be cumbersome and longwinded, but also dangerous, as it indicates to 
outsiders that rhino are present in the reserve (Fike, Pers. Comm., 2012). 
As with security, the cost of dehorning rhino is significant. A recent estimate by a 
private game reserve in the Eastern Cape Province of South Africa put the price of 
dehorning at between R6,000 and R10,000 per rhino per year, depending on how many 
animals were being dehorned (Grocott’s Mail, 2012). Dehorning is only likely to be 
effective if entire rhino populations are dehorned, as suggested by Milner-Gulland 
(1999) and reiterated in the commissioned report (Lindsey and Taylor, 2011). However, 
where these two sources differ is that Milner-Gulland (1999) suggests that there is a 
choice between spending on security or dehorning. While the budget constraint is, of 
course relevant, both the commissioned report on dehorning (Lindsey and Taylor, 2011) 
and the Guidelines for rhino conservation strategies (SADC-RPRC, 2006) strongly 
emphasise that dehorning is unlikely to be effective without accompanying increases in 
security, “otherwise rhinos are highly likely to be poached, regardless of their horn 
status” (Lindsey and Taylor, 2011:6). 
3. The Current Market Context 
Traditional single market models for endangered species indicate that bringing onto the 
market legally harvested and confiscated goods reduce the incentives to poach.  
However, the specific case of rhinoceros poaching is different.  While the scope for 
marketisation has been considered and suggested, the balance of studies and arguments 
would suggest in the context of South Africa that there are strong biological, ecological 
and market opportunity constraints that limit the scope for on-going, episodic sales of 
rhinoceros horns for reducing poaching incentives (DEA, 2014; Lopes, 2015). The 
prevailing market circumstances currently comprise a complete trade ban with purely 
illegal supply, but with demand arising from purely noncompliant consumers. 
The general orthodox pro-trading literature such as espoused in Fischer (2004) neglects 
many widely discussed and known institutional characteristics and constraints in this 
particular species context. These relate to: 
 (i) The poaching rate being derived from the number of rhinoceros kills is likely to be a 
highly misleading indicator of the actual level of enforcement effort needed and of the 
level of poaching effort actually expended. This is because there are many unreported 
aborted poaching expeditions following engagement with security staff, as well as 
unreported poacher mortality (Rademeyer, 2012). Adopting the same tactics as some 
poachers, some private game reserves have been known to hire professional 
hunter/trackers to ‘live’ in the reserves for a period of time and shadow the rhinoceros 
herds, so that they may ambush poachers on the ground. Given the vast expanses of land 
available to bury in shallow graves and the presence of predators such as lions, bodies 
of poachers ambushed are unlikely to be recovered. Further, given the extreme nature of 
this game reserve security tactic, it is typically not formally reported to the police 
authorities. 
(ii) The assumption that the confiscation rate (used by Fischer (2004)) to describe the 
amount of poached material received following arrest or apprehension of poachers) is 
entirely exogenous to market actors and set by Government would be fallacious in this 
specific context. In many instances of rhino poaching, there are more than strong 
suspicions of corruption and complicity by some Government officials (at various 
levels) furnished by threats, illicit side payments and commission payments 
(Rademeyer, 2012; Fike, Pers. Comm., 2012). This can be set against a background of 
common knowledge regarding high rhinoceros horn sale prices. In these circumstances, 
the likelihood of poaching-serving corruption and transmission of insider information 
would inevitably decrease the confiscation rate. 
(iii) Currently, horn stockpiles from natural mortality and the exercise of legitimate 
game reserve herd management are never legally sold on the market to the criminal 
supply chain.  
Without resale of confiscated goods, greater enforcement may increase total poaching if 
the price increase outpaces the additional confiscation and critically this depends on the 
price elasticity of demand for rhinoceros horn.  
4 The Regulated Market Approach (RMA) 
The underlying logic of a RMA is that, through a series of sales of state sanctioned 
stockpiles of confiscated endangered species products and/or endangered species 
products from CBPs, the market price can be influenced downwards. It is contended this 
would reduce the incentive to poach and thus reduce the rate of poaching-related killing 
of endangered wildlife.  That said, even strong advocates of a RMA in this context 
typically acknowledge that the actual outcome of such a policy remains highly 
uncertain, given that for some endangered species products, demand seems both very 
persistent and highly inelastic (Brown and Layton, 2001; Conrad, 2012). Accordingly, 
there remains a fear that latent demand may well be stoked to such a degree by legalised 
trading that poaching activity accelerates and extinction progresses more swiftly. There 
are some reports pointing to cases where CBPs have been associated with, or considered 
as a possible means of achieving, reductions in wild animal hunting and poaching levels 
(see, for example, Wright et al. 2001, Lee et al. 2014, Steyn 2015). However, these are 
often in the context of poaching across a range of wild animals, including for ‘bush’ 
meat or for wild bird egg collectors. On more detailed scrutiny of the evidence, the 
strength of the inferred causality might in some cases be reasonably deemed to be 
fragile. It is sometimes based on a single case study program which may now be defunct 
and/or where evidence is difficult to disentangle from other effects, which may have led 
to some reductions in poaching activity, but only at a particular geographical location 
for a particular species and during a particular limited period. Further, some biologists 
contend that CBPs are high cost responses and should only be seen “…as a last resort in 
species recovery, and not a prophylactic or long-term solution because of the inexorable 
genetic and phenotypic changes that occur in captive environments” (Snyder et al., 
1996: 338). 
Additional analytical problems emerge since the path to any overall “market 
equilibrium” price for many such endangered species goods is not readily transparent 
and thus extremely difficult to observe and monitor, if it can reasonably be said to exist 
at all. Equilibrium-orientated economic analyses may inform understanding of 
stationary states or steady, balanced market or economy-wide growth. However, the 
rhino horn market could be said to be characterised by systematic disequilibrium given 
it features complex dynamics and irregular fluctuations (in biological, spatial and 
economic terms); overlapping waves of structural/institutional changes and also market 
evolution (Day, 1987). These features may be seen, for example, in the context of 
variety in the pattern of conservation effort and deployment of protection resources and 
also as a consequence of actions following domestic or international political/legal 
decisions and treaties.  
 
Further, for some poachers, that are part of a strongly vertically integrated illegal supply 
chain, there is simply no external price for the poached horn that enters the supply 
chain. For those poaching gangs functioning outside such strongly vertically integrated 
operations, the illegally traded endangered species goods that enter the supply chain will 
typically form part of a series of intermittent, secretive bilateral trades. Grapevine price-
relevant information transmission between other suppliers (poachers) and buyers is thus 
likely to be a very noisy and fuzzy signal of even fairly recent actual transaction prices.  
 
The dynamics of expanding demand conditions and the inevitably secretive nature of 
bilateral trading amongst illegal buyers and sellers create suitable conditions for 
persistent and considerable price dispersion. Hence, in this context, fixating on a single 
overall market price has little value. Any discerned criminal grapevine price is also 
likely to diverge from earlier bilateral transaction prices for strategic bargaining reasons 
during negotiation of the price for commissioned future poaching expeditions. Such 
expeditions will also vary widely in terms of access difficulty and other location-
specific characteristics such as the outcome of reconnaissance assessments of potential 
security resistance to be anticipated.   
 Price-relevant associated information is also likely to be deliberately censored to mask 
the hidden interplay of different criminal syndicates, enterprises and illegal end-use 
consumers in order to obstruct criminal and journalistic investigation. As such, any 
reliable and credible market information is very scarce indeed. Further, while legitimate 
wildlife auction prices seemingly offer some insight to the value of the endangered 
species goods, they are in practice a very misleading guide.  This is because hammer 
prices at such auctions are only a small fraction of the generalised cost of maintaining a 
valuable live asset among a relatively small pool of game reserve owner-bidders.  Given 
that the remaining rhinoceros herds are being aggressively poached in South Africa, a 
very substantial element of the total cost of sustaining the herd are the very high asset 
protection costs (Amin et al., 2006). These comprise the cost of recruiting and retaining 
well-paid, skilled, armed security staff signalling qualities of professional integrity (in 
an attempt to minimise collusion with poachers) as well as extensive deployment and 
maintenance of sophisticated anti-poaching technology over extensive and often 
isolated terrain (SADC-RPRC, 2006).  
These costs have escalated so rapidly that it has had the effect of markedly depressing 
the auction prices achieved for live rhinoceros such that they are cheaper than the cost 
of the removed horn in illegal trading (as shown in Table 1). Additionally, it has had the 
effect of encouraging camouflaged participation in the auction markets to service illegal 
rhinoceros horn trading. Nevertheless, as some wildlife is on the verge of extinction, 
then some urgent policy activity and experimentation seems warranted. Indeed, for 
some species of rhinoceros (e.g. black rhinoceros) remaining in South Africa there is 
little time left to act before it is too late. 
However, policy prescriptions that feature in some of the economic literature on 
endangered species conservation do seem to suggest that a generic or similar RMA 
could be adopted for various endangered species, even though there are known to be 
enormous differences in the market demand, institutional, bioeconomic, ecological, 
physiological and veterinary conditions that apply among such species. Damania and 
Bulte (2007), for example, point out that some supply side policies can often neglect the 
institutional framework within which the wildlife trade takes place, and ignore the 
potential strategic responses of economic agents.  At a mundane, practical level, this 
study aims to give a fuller account of this framework and those responses. 
In this study we explain, for example, why even though elephants and rhinoceros are 
both slow-growing, large mammals, the scope and scheme design issues for stockpiling 
tusks and horns via regulated hunting and CBPs are very different for these two 
animals.  These differences are shown to have an important bearing on the scale and 
type of RMA that is feasible and for the nature of the relevant trading market and 
bioeconomic modelling.   
In the context of our example, there are many potential substitutes for ivory, but sadly, 
there seems to be no currently discernible effective substitute for rhinoceros horns 
among consumers. Furthermore, unlike ivory, there are currently no legal market uses 
for rhinoceros horn. The horns are now currently mainly used for two main purposes, 
each of which may require different emphases and instruments in the design of any set 
of policy responses. Bergstrom (1990) is not entirely correct that is it primarily used as 
an aphrodisiac or libido enhancement. The main use is as a ground-down ingredient in 
Traditional Eastern Medicine (TEM) used, hitherto, in the context of very serious or 
life-threatening illnesses. This goes some way to explaining the highly inelastic nature 
of this market. More recently and rather worryingly for rhinoceros conservation, the 
powdered horn has become popular for even minor ailments such as colds, light fevers 
and flu. Rising real income growth among middle and high income groups in China, 
Thailand and Vietnam have helped drive this significant market expansion that support 
this extension of its usage. That said, there is no credible medical evidence of any 
genuine therapeutic benefit.  
The second main use of rhinoceros horn is as a status gift and/or speculative asset, 
mainly in China, Thailand, Laos and Vietnam, for politicians, dignitaries and senior 
executives (Rademeyer, 2012, Hance, 2013). For these consumer-investors such horns 
serve as relatively compact and mobile stores of value at the current market price. The 
horns must increase in value with any increase in regulatory stringency and as 
extinction approaches. In the case of TEM users, even despite the potentially huge scale 
and growth of market demand, individual believers and TEM practitioners at least have 
some incentive to try to retain continued access to a supply of powdered rhinoceros 
horn.  In the latter case, possessors of complete horns held as just speculative assets 
actually have an incentive to accelerate extinction. Thus, it is suggested that as 
perceived rarity increases then incentives to poach also increase (Hall et al., 2008). One 
key theme that emerges in this paper is the importance of considering the specificity of 
particular endangered species goods markets in the design of polices involving a RMA. 
Using rhinoceros horn as an example, we show how scientific and institutional factors 
do serve to limit the efficiency and constrain the operation of a generic endangered 
species RMA design. An attempt is made to trace the necessary design and 
implementation requirements for a more rhinoceros horn-specific regulated market and 
highlight key differences in this context as compared with other endangered species 
goods market studies.  To improve the probability of success it is contended that the 
RMA would need to form but one of a range of policy elements within a given policy 
mix (including increased enforcement levels) in order to retard the path to extinction for 
some species of rhinoceros. 
Departing markedly from Fischer’s (2004) general characterisation of law-abiding 
(stigma-conscious) consumers and illegal consumers operating in dual markets (for the 
general case of endangered species-based goods trading), this paper sets out a species-
specific case study to capture the likely dominant market characteristics relating to 
rhinoceros horn, sourced specifically from South Africa. While the Fischer (2004) paper 
is a good generalisation of the intricacies of endangered species products markets, the 
case of rhinoceros horn has specific characteristics that warrant further detailed 
exploration.  It is argued that an analytical resolution based (at a minimum) on this level 
of market specificity would be necessary in practice. In this way, economists would 
begin to be more adequately informed by the often geographically specific and complex 
layering of scientific, institutional and market factors that would shape the working 
dimensions and operation of a regulated market for a specific endangered species 
product. 
Fischer (2004) presented a theoretical model to explain the market for the products of 
endangered species. She used a dual market model where consumers either acquires 
only legally certified products, or are indifferent to the source of the product. The 
suppliers of the product consist of those who have acquired the product through illegal 
means (poachers) and legal entities dealing in certified goods (government or 
enforcement agencies). 
The supply in the illegal market is a function of the amount confiscated, with the cost of 
increased supply increasing as the catch increased. The supply functions for the illegal 
and legal markets respectively, are as follows: 
𝑆𝑢 =  𝜑𝐾 
𝑆𝑐 ≤ 𝐻 + (1 −  𝜑)𝐾 
where 𝑆𝑢 and 𝑆𝑐 are the total quantity of illegal and legal products respectively, K is the 
amount of poached product, H is the product harvested legally and 𝜑 is the share of the 
illegal product that is not impounded by the authorities. 
The demand relationships are more complex, especially for the law-abiding consumers.  
These law abiding consumers are assumed to purchase only from the legal sources, but 
increased amounts of illegal product on the market will increase the stigma attached to 
acquiring the product and reduce utility. On the other hand, the consumers of illegal 
product are not afflicted by the same stigma and their satisfaction is derived solely form 
consumption. The utility maximising relationships for the law-abiding consumers and 
recalcitrant consumers respectively, are as follows: 
𝑉(𝑄𝐿
𝑐, 𝜎, 𝐾) −  𝑃𝑐𝑄𝐿
𝑐 
𝑈(𝑄𝑛
𝑐  +  𝑄𝑢) −  𝑃𝑐𝑄𝑁
𝑐 − 𝑃𝑢𝑄𝑢 
where 𝑄𝐿
𝑐 is the consumption of the certified product by law-abiding consumers, 𝜎 is the 
stigma rate, 𝑃𝑐 is the price of certified product, 𝑄𝑛
𝑐  and 𝑄𝑢 are the quantities of certified 
and illegal product consumed by recalcitrant consumers and 𝑃𝑢 is the price is illegal 
product. 
The demand and supply relationships in Fischer’s (2004) model are influenced by a 
number of crucial factors. The supply relationship in the illegal market is restricted by 
the proportion of the catch confiscated by authorities and the certified market is 
influenced by the amount of the impounded product that is sold on the legal market. The 
quantity demanded on the legal market is negatively affected by the stigma attached to 
the proportion of illegal product on the market and the repulsion connected with 
poaching. 
In this study context, we assert that the simple theoretical model of Fischer (2004) 
relating to the case of a full trade ban situation is not appropriate in the context of rhino 
horns. There are some key points of departure. Foremost among these being there are no 
legal and stigma conscious consumers.  Instead, all consumers are best classified as 
members of one of two groups of illegal consumers. Group 1 comprises ‘believer’ 
consumers who simply wish to retain access (albeit misguidedly) to a source of 
powdered rhinoceros horn, in order to access its purported therapeutic benefits.  Group 
2 comprises consumers who seek more complete rhinoceros horns to serve as assets 
(stores of value). These two groups of consumers do not face the same incentives and 
they are all served by illegal suppliers.  
The illegal suppliers are comprised of a complex supply chain of criminal syndicates. 
These syndicates feature from the lower to upper reaches:  Asian market distributors, 
Rhinoceros herd intelligence acquisition and reconnaissance operatives – sometimes 
involving the sourcing of corruptible local stakeholders and, of course, the actual 
poaching team in the field.  These suppliers also face a range of incentives and not just 
in relation to varying their effort level with respect to the level of risk and reward. 
Illegal supplier incentives would clearly change in the regulated market context, where 
the same consumers feature, but in addition, there also exists a regulated supplier 
participant.  Given it challenges their market power and revenue streams, illegal 
suppliers would have an incentive to undermine CBPs via turf war activity as in other 
illegal supply chains and markets, such as for crack cocaine, heroin etc.   As such, CBP 
locations could reasonably expect retaliatory strikes of intensive poaching activity on 
relatively densely stocked CBP rhinoceros herds. Unlike some other wildlife species, 
they would biologically require very extensive geographical reserve areas to sustain 
successful breeding. This renders a CBP extremely costly in security terms and thus a 
very high market price for rhinoceros horns would need to be sustained to establish 
from scratch and then continue to support an adequate number of these programs. 
It is important to make clear that given the relevant security concerns and issues, 
suitable CBP operations cannot be co-located with the vast majority of private game 
reserves, which need reasonable public access, large flows of visitors/tourists and 
ancillary services customers (accommodation/shops/restaurants) that comprise the main 
revenue stream. Poacher reconnaissance teams have often posed as tourists and visitors 
(Rademeyer, 2012). Accordingly, many private game reserves would actually be 
unwilling to host CBPs. This arises because it may adversely impact on (i) owners’ 
lifestyles and (ii) other game reserve revenue streams, as they become an even more 
attractive and regular high profile target for poaching teams.  Thus, the most likely 
location options for a CPB would be a remote and unused part of an existing state 
owned national wildlife park or a remote, wholly new facility that first required 
extensive land purchases and/or compulsory state land acquisition. Ideally, a CBP 
operation for rhinoceros herds would be characterised by very extensive geographical 
terrain offering suitable flora coverage for shade and protection within a remote region 
with difficult public access (Fike, Pers. Comm., 2012). 
5. Beyond the Single Panacea: Other Instruments and Institutions in the Policy 
Mix.  
The paper argues that regulation of a legal market for rhino horn would be difficult 
given that the illegal market is already well established and that well-resourced 
syndicates already have in place extensive networks of suppliers and buyers. As was 
found in other cases, and is highlighted in the historical branch of New Institutional 
Economics (NIE), path dependency suggests that the carefully established strategic 
relationships comprising these extensive networks are likely to endure, irrespective of 
any changes to national policy or regulation (Bartley et al. 2008).  Further, given that 
poaching syndicates have invested in and deployed sophisticated specialist equipment 
and trained personnel, then such significant sunk costs will only very reluctantly be 
abandoned.  
 
Rumours of current dubious practices amongst government officials themselves, such a 
turning a blind eye to the multiple use of permits, and selling information about where 
rhinos are located to poaching syndicates (Rademeyer 2012), indicate that incentives for 
government to effectively regulate a legal market would be low. The costs of regulation 
would be high, and the rewards for turning a blind eye to ongoing illegal trade would be 
significant.  
Without careful institutional design, as well as a period of experimentation and learning 
by doing observed in other cases of institutional redesign ( i.e. drawing on pilot studies 
and other conservation projects/policies in other country and species contexts) 
(Helderman 2007), a regulated market approach may lead to a significant worsening of 
the situation. Potentially this could feature systematic overexploitation of the resource if 
the overall outcome is unduly dominated by less fettered market forces (the market 
institution), rather than a government (regulated) institution, informed by biological and 
conservation scientists. In this study context it could potentially drive rhino numbers 
towards or below minimum viable herd sizes and have dire consequences for rhino 
conservation outcomes. Rather than presenting the market as a straightforward and 
simple alternative solution to the problem of rhino poaching, we argue that the 
institutional design must be carefully considered, with a focus on the complementarity 
of command and control and profit driven systems, and with careful consideration of 
institutional hierarchy and complementarity in a multi-faceted policy mix.  
For example, given the need to financially support CBPs during start up, and for many 
years ahead of their possible contribution to any regulated supply chain, then either all 
the operations would have to be supported by direct Government subsidy and/or 
institutions supporting soft loan financing arrangements would have to be secured for 
audited and approved business expenditures including security technology and staff. 
Fairness criteria might suggest South Africa and others bring pressure to bear on China, 
Thailand, Laos and Vietnam to become substantial partner contributors and stakeholders 
in financing these transfers.  
Security requires on-going expenditures and if relying on auction revenue shares as the 
main vehicle of financial support, then there is a possibility that the share of the 
proceeds from the auction sales may not always be sufficient to cover these costs, and at 
least in the years and decades before a sustainable herd can make substantial regulated 
supply contributions.  Accordingly, along the lines of agricultural price support systems 
consideration could be given to the introduction of institutional mechanisms responsible 
for the disbursement of some floor revenue share from auction proceeds.   
Focussing on TEM practitioners and their believers, there is the possibility that the 
market could be re-orientated such that it was directed to rely more exclusively on 
sustainably managed rhinoceros horn by pursuing a ‘medicalisation’ route for the 
regulated supply chain.  In this way, it may be possible to emphasize pharmaceutical 
purity and quality assured marques for ‘ready ground’ horn and potentially this could be 
operationalised via strategic alliances and international joint ventures with state 
sanctioned and market leading Chinese/Thai/Vietnamese commercial pharmaceutical 
stakeholders.  This perhaps offers a more promising route to displace the illegal Asian 
market supply chains into the longer term.  In the transition period, it may be possible to 
secure high quality pro bono marketing effort from leading marketing agencies who 
wished to participate for state contracts in South Africa. Professional and effective 
campaigns could thus be assured to support the safe pharmaceutical grade regulated 
product. 
The market segment seeking complete rhinoceros horns pose a real problem given their 
incentives without or with a regulated supply. Whatever the market outcome, 
speculators will exist and given their incentives in the face of extinction, one may take a 
firm line that this market segment should be undermined by all means possible.  
Undermining the market segment could take the form of degrading the product through 
the application of indelible dyes and/or or anti-tick poison. This could also be 
supplemented by embedding a tracking device in the horn (Rhino Rescue Project, 
2012). To enhance the methods it is suggested as many observers as possible (press and 
employees) should be present to monitor the process and spread the message. In 
addition, it is recommended that signage near access points and entrances indicating the 
use of these dyes and poisons should be prominently displayed. According to Fowlds 
(Pers. Comm., 2012), 60 to 70 rhino have received the treatment in South Africa to date. 
None of these treated rhinos has been poached, although one died because of the 
anaesthetic administered during the application of the treatment.  
Another means of undermining the market relates to the associated fake rhino horn 
market. Currently, fake complete horns are a smaller element of the market but a greater 
active toleration of producers of fake complete horns could be helpful to introduce 
lemon good aspects into this market at the South African part of the supply chain. 
However, individuals who can afford a complete horn should also be able to afford 
biochemical analysis to prove the horn is wholly rhinoceros keratin. That said, such 
analysis might not be readily available within South Africa for illegal consumers.  It 
may also be possible to consider institutionalising routine DNA analysis to verify the 
source of the rhino horn to support the regulated market. Confusingly, but possibly 
useful to the pursuance of a lemons market tactic, it has been the case in Vietnam that 
sellers of rhino horn have been allowed to use the term fake horn to signal they have 
available real rhino horn for sale (Brown, 2012). 
Another lower cost approach to reduce incentives to poach is to raise deterrence even 
further. One means of doing this is explicitly to legitimise a shoot first policy against 
poachers, to legitimise the use of ambush trackers and to allow keratin detection inside 
embassy diplomatic bags, which have been found to be a key trade route in some illegal 
supply chains (Rademeyer, 2012). In this way, data that are more accurate may also 
emerge on the level of poaching effort. 
6. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
This study draws on various sources of evidence in South Africa regarding the plight of 
rhinoceros herds against a depressing onslaught of poaching activity, which, if left 
unchecked, could soon lead to the extinction of some species of rhinoceros and 
ultimately existentially threaten all species in South Africa, which is the their main 
habitat. We show that the price of a live rhinoceros is a mere fraction of the price of just 
its horn because of the reserve and CBP management costs and more significantly the 
high costs of poaching avoidance. This price disparity will continue in the short run, as 
CBPs have to be established from scratch to be able routinely to contribute horn in a 
regulated supply chain. This process requires a high market price to be sustained and 
potentially for decades, to ensure sufficient herds remain without threat of extinction.   
The high costs of anti-poaching security simply cannot be met on an on-going basis by 
current stockpiled reserve releases and game reserves and CBPs own revenues, at least 
in the short-run. Some supplementary policy instruments will be needed to allow a 
RMA to have the potential to work in the long-run. Currently, stockpiled horn releases 
at auction and CPBs without additional financial and market support are unlikely to be 
able to help save some rhinoceros species from extinction in the short-run.  Even then, 
the outcome from a RMA is uncertain in the face of demand persistence and potentially 
inelastic and growing demand. Some consumer market action in the Asian countries 
involved seems essential and warranted even if it is just premised on using more 
sustainable and pharmaceutical grade rhino horn. There are some signs that the 
necessity of deploying an international diplomatic approach is increasingly becoming 
acknowledged (Brown, 2012). 
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Table 1. Prices for White Rhino in South Africa 1982 - 2012. 
Year Real Prices 
(2012) ZAR* 
% change from 
previous  data 
point 
Average % 
change p/a 
Source 
1982 14,160   t' Sas-Rolfes (2010) 
1986 81,400 475% 118.75% t' Sas-Rolfes (2010) 
1989 266,560 227.50% 75.84% t' Sas-Rolfes (2010) 
2004 389,326 46.00% 9.20% Animal Rights Africa 
(2009) 
2005 164,009 -137.40% -137.40% Animal Rights Africa 
(2009) 
2006 200,473 22.23% 22.23% Animal Rights Africa 
(2009) 
2007 255,636 27.52% 27.52% Animal Rights Africa 
(2009) 
2008 295,997 15.80% 15.80% Animal Rights Africa 
(2009) 
2012 239,500 -19.10% -4.78% GFR Game Sale (2012) 
* All data presented in 2012 prices, calculated using the Consumer Price Index (Statistics South Africa, 
2012). 
** The current exchange rate of R9.86:1US$; R15.85:1 UK Pound; R13.43: 1 Eur. 
Table 2. Annual numbers of rhino poaching incidents and arrests in South Africa. 
Year Rhino poaching incidents Arrests 
2010 333 165 
2011 448 232 
2012 588 246 
Source: DEA (27/11/2012). 
Appendix Table A: Estimated costs of anti-poaching rhino security measures 
Expenditure Item Cost (in South African Rand) 
Rehabilitation (if possible) of surviving rhino 
that have been violently dehorned 
R40,000 – R160,000 
Dehorning (ideally once a year) R6,000 – R10,000 per rhino 
Fitting of transmitter devices for monitoring, 
including helicopter, veterinary drugs and 
bracelet transmitter 
R8,000 – R10,000 per rhino 
Helicopter support program R400 per hour of flying 
Additional security personal (Net monthly cost 
of employment) 
Entry-level ranger  
Scout (Ranger with experience and advanced 
weapons training)  
 
 
R3000 – R4000 
R6000 + 
Dedicated anti-poaching vehicle R6,000 per month (including 
running costs) 
Bullet proof vests R4,000 each 
Security personal uniforms R2,500 each 
Handheld radios R2,200 each 
Night vision binoculars R17,000 each 
Normal binoculars R2,000 each 
Thermal imagery vehicle pathfinder camera R36,000  
Handheld thermal imagery camera R68,000  
Spotlight R1,500 
Telemetry aerial R1,200 
Telemetry receiver R7,000 
Horn implant device R2,750 each 
Sources: Grocott’s Mail 4/12/2012:14; Fowlds 2012 
